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JUMP BALL: THE UNSETTLED LAW OF 
REPRESENTING COLLEGE BASKETBALL STARS AND 
MONETIZING THEIR NAMES, IMAGES AND 
LIKENESSES 
Michael A. McCann* 
The legal framework governing college athletes is in a transforma-
tive era. Under pressure by state governments and members of Con-
gress, the NCAA is contemplating structural changes that would permit 
college athletes to license their names, images and likenesses.  Should 
these changes come to pass, college athletes—most likely through the 
negotiation vehicle of trade associations—would be compensated for the 
use of their identities in apparel, merchandise, video games, television 
broadcasts and related goods and services.  The changes would upend 
decades of NCAA adherence to “amateurism,” a controversial system 
of rules that denies compensation opportunities on the logic that pay 
would corrupt college athletes, betray educational goals and undermine 
the consumer appeal of collegiate athletic contests. 
This Article examines the mechanisms by which college athletes 
should be able to secure representation for their commercial interests.  
Within that area of study, this Article focuses on men’s college basket-
ball players who declare for the annual National Basketball Association 
(“NBA”) Draft while preserving the option to return to school. The 
NCAA has proposed requirements for agents to represent these players.  
Such requirements are of questionable merit and raise concerns about 
the demographics of persons they might tend to exclude as agents.  This 
Article contends that while the NCAA may have the legal capacity to 
exclude agents, it should weigh potential adverse consequences on com-
petition and socioeconomic status.  This argument has concrete 
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implications on college basketball and more broadly on the economics 
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Why does a job require a college degree?  For decades, employers 
have reflexively attached a college degree requirement to many positions 
that can been performed without one.  Some have argued that earning a 
college degree signifies basic competency in reading, writing and critical 
analysis—even though no two paths to a college degree are the same.  
Others have presupposed that a college degree is a reasonable yardstick 
for measuring whether a person is “educated”—even though college de-
grees demand varying degrees of effort and knowledge.  And still others 
focus on the sheer obtainment of a piece of paper that signifies a degree, 
even though “diploma mills” and other dubious entities bestow thou-
sands of college degrees every year.1 
This dynamic has changed in recent years. Google, Apple, Whole 
Foods and many other successful companies have dropped the college 
 
 1. See George Gollin et al., Complexities in Legislative Suppression of Diploma Mills, 
21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1-3 (2010) (discussing the proliferation of diploma mills, in-
cluding the possibility that diploma mills “sell” more degrees than in any one state except 
California and New York). 
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degree requirement in lieu of more holistic evaluations of candidates’ 
experiences and skills.2  In this more contemporary light, a degree is no 
longer viewed as the exclusive marker of a candidate’s achievement or 
potential.  It instead constitutes one type of proxy for employers to con-
sider. 
In August 2019, the governing body of college sports, the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), bucked this modern-day 
trend.3  At that time, the NCAA announced that it would adopt certifica-
tion requirements for agents who seek to advise college basketball un-
derclassmen on whether they ought to leave college early for the Na-
tional Basketball Association (NBA).4  A player advised by an 
unauthorized agent risks forfeiting the remainder of his eligibility to 
play. 5  He can also imperil his team’s chances to compete in the NCAA, 
which can sanction colleges that play ineligible players.  In fact, prior to 
2019, men’s college basketball players who retained any agent forfeited 
their remaining eligibility.6  The NCAA has long prohibited college ath-
letes from professional representation.  Absent narrow exceptions dis-
cussed below, NCAA bylaws express that a college player who signs an 
agent, or who hires an attorney to represent him or her in contract nego-
tiations, is subject to forfeiting their NCAA eligibility.7 
Pursuant to the 2018 recommendation of a college sports reform 
commission led by former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the 
NCAA recently permitted college basketball players to hire “NCAA-
certified” agents.8  Specifically, between the end of a college player’s 
season and the second week of April, the player can solicit an evaluation 
from the NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee.9  “This committee 
 
 2. Courtney Connley, Google, Apple and 12 other companies that no longer require 
employees to have a college degree, CNBC (Oct. 8, 2018, 12:51 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/16/15-companies-that-no-longer-require-employees-to-
have-a-college-degree.html. 
 3. Cindy Boren, New Rules Proposal for Agents Draws Ire, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2019, 
at D2. 
 4. Id. 
 5. NCAA, 2018-2019 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.3 (2019) [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL]. 
 6. Id. § 12.3.1.2; Press Release, NCAA, NCAA amends agent certification requirements 
(Aug. 12, 2019, 2:00 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-
amends-agent-certification-requirements [hereinafter NCAA]. 
 7. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, §§ 12.2.1, 12.3.2. 
 8. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Alters Rules for Agents and Draft in Wake of Basketball Cor-
ruption Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/08/08/sports/ncaa-basketball-agents.html. 
 9. Michael McCann, How Rich Paul Could Build a Case Against the NCAA Over Its 
New Criteria for Agents, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.si.com/college-
basketball/2019/08/06/ncaa-criteria-exclude-rich-paul-others-certified-nbpa [hereinafter 
McCann, How Rich Paul Could Build a Case]. 
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includes NBA team executives who provide candid and confidential pro-
jections of a player’s draft stock.”10  Provided the underclassman makes 
such a request by the April deadline, he can retain an NCAA-certified 
agent.11  The player then has until the end of May to decide whether to 
leave school in hopes of becoming an NBA player.12 
Representation by an agent enables underclassmen who are unsure 
if, and when, they would be selected in the annual NBA draft to work 
out for NBA teams and discuss their prospects with experts.  They might 
also use that time to assess the value of potential endorsement deals.  If 
an underclassman gains unfavorable insights, he can remove himself 
from draft consideration and return to college.  The annual NBA Draft 
tends to be heavily populated by underclassmen.  Of the twenty-seven 
college players selected in the first round of the 2019 NBA Draft, 
twenty-four were underclassmen.13 
The NCAA initially classified agents who were certified by the Na-
tional Basketball Players’ Association (NBPA), the union for players in 
the National Basketball Association, as NCAA-certified agents.14  The 
NCAA, in other words, trusted the judgment of the NBPA with respect 
to the qualifications of agents.  As the players’ exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative and pursuant to Section 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act, the NBPA determines which individuals are qualified to advise 
NBA players and represent them in employment contract negotiations.15  
To that end, the NBPA defines several conditions for certification of 
agents: possessing a bachelor’s degree or relevant negotiation experi-
ence; passing a standardized test; paying an annual fee; negotiating a 
contract between a player and an NBA team at least once every five 
years; and satisfying other measures purportedly designed to assess basic 
competencies.16 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Jeremy Woo, Stay or Go? With NBA Draft Deadline Looming, These Players Face 
Pivotal Decisions, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 23, 2019), https://www.si.com/college-bas-
ketball/2019/05/23/nba-draft-decisions-kansas-kentucky-louisville-lsu-virginia. 
 13. NBA.com Staff, 2019 NBA Draft results: Picks 1-60, NBA (June 21, 2019, 2:55 AM), 
http://www.nba.com/article/2019/06/21/2019-nba-draft-results-picks-1-60. 
 14. See McCann, How Rich Paul Could Build a Case, supra note 9. 
 15. Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
151-68 (1982)), amended by Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 
120, 61 Stat. 136, and Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act 
of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519. 
 16. NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NBPA REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS AS AMENDED FEB. 2018 [hereinafter NBPA REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS], https://cosmic-s3.imgix.net/e3bb4d60-7b1a-11e9-9bf5-
8bad98088629-NBPAAgentRegulations.pdf (last visited, Mar. 1, 2020). 
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In August 2019, NCAA terminated its reliance on the NBPA qual-
ification and announced that it would define its own criteria for certifi-
cation process for agents.17  One of NCAA’s proposed criterion included 
the requirement that agents possess a bachelor’s degree.18  Stressing the 
importance of education level, the NCAA insisted that an agent who 
graduated from college is uniquely capable of providing advice on the 
choice between remaining in school and turning pro.19  Implementation 
of NCAA agent requirements is set to begin in 2020, with the first exam 
currently scheduled for November 2020.20 
A college degree requirement would bar some agents who are al-
ready certified to represent NBA players.  Rich Paul, known in NBA 
circles as “the King Maker,”21 is one of them.  He is among the most 
successful and skilled sports agents in the American sports industry.22  
Paul is the founder of Klutch Sports Group.23  He represents LeBron 
James, Anthony Davis, Draymond Green, John Wall, Ben Simmons, and 
other NBA superstars.24  Paul bypassed college to instead obtain “real 
world” experience.25 
Judged by metrics that measure capacity to advise basketball play-
ers on professional matters, Paul is unquestionably qualified.  During the 
2019-20 NBA season alone, Paul’s clients will collectively earn an 
astonishing $264 million.26  He is especially heralded for his business 
acumen and his capacity to maximize player preferences.27  Black Sports 
Online columnist Mark Gunnels recently hailed Paul as “the best agent 
 
 17. NCAA amends agent certification requirements, NCAA (Aug. 12, 2019, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-amends-agent-certification-
requirements. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Agent Certification, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/agents-and-amateur-
ism/agent-certification (last visited, Mar. 1, 2020). 
 20. Agent Certification, supra note 19; see also NCAA LEGISLATIVE SERVICES 
DATABASE, AMATEURISM—USE OF AGENTS—NCAA-CERTIFIED AGENTS—
MEN’S BASKETBALL, NCAA (2018-2020), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/pro-
posalView?id=102758. 
 21. S.L. Price, The King Maker: Why Rich Paul Will Own the NBA Summer, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (June 12, 2019), https://www.si.com/nba/2019/06/12/rich-paul-klutch-sports-
group-lakers-pelicans-lebron-james-anthony-davis. 
 22. Nathan Ocampo, Everything we know about Rich Paul, CLUTCHPOINTS (June 15, 
2020), https://clutchpoints.com/everything-we-know-about-rich-paul/. 
 23. McCann, How Rich Paul Could Build a Case, supra note 9. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Price, supra note 21. 
 26. Rich Paul-NBA Agents, HOOPSHYPE, https://hoopshype.com/reps/rich-paul/ (last 
visited, Mar. 1, 2020). 
 27. See Clay Skipper, Rich Paul: Power Broker of the Year, GQ (Dec. 16, 
2019), https://www.gq.com/story/rich-paul-powerbroker-interview. 
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in the game. Period.”28  Yet Paul is not a college graduate.29  A college 
degree requirement would thus deny him a chance to share his wisdom 
with underclassmen who are debating whether to turn pro or stay in 
school.  The college degree requirement attracted immediate scorn from 
influential members of the basketball community.30  They dismissed it 
as substantively unwise and racially insensitive.31  To that point, James 
derisively termed the exclusion of Paul and others like him “The Rich 
Paul Rule.”32  The label stuck.  Soon other NBA stars weighed in.  Ok-
lahoma City Thunder guard Chris Paul, for instance, tweeted, “This is 
crazy!” while stressing “some life experiences are as valuable, if not 
more, than diplomas.”33  Politicians also sensed an opportunity to ex-
press a critical view.  Entrepreneur and former presidential candidate 
Andrew Yang tweeted, “Instead of putting arbitrary requirements on 
agents, the NCAA should pay Division I athletes who generate millions 
in revenue for their schools.  Coaches and athletic directors make mil-
lions while the kids pretend to be amateurs and scrounge for meal 
money.”34 
Paul’s story should resemble oft-cited American success stories.  
Thomas Edison, Maya Angelou, Bill Gates, Ellen DeGeneres, and Steve 
Jobs are among noteworthy figures who ascended to professional heights 
without earning a college degree.35  Yet agents who bypassed college are 
sometimes cynically nicknamed “street agents.”36  The phrase attempts 
to conjure racially tinged stereotypes of persons who work “on the 
street” and infer that these agents are somehow connected to bribes to 
 
 28. Mark Gunnels (@MarkAGunnels), TWITTER (Aug. 3, 2019, 8:55 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/MarkAGunnels/status/1157681349722955776. 
 29. McCann, How Rich Paul Could Build a Case, supra note 9. 
 30. Tyler Lauletta, LeBron James praises agent Rich Paul, who quickly helped to bring 




 31. Id. 
 32. Boren, supra note 3. 
 33. Chris Paul (@CP3), TWITTER (Aug. 6, 2019, 9:25 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/CP3/status/1158957194513145856. 
 34. Andrew Yang (@AndrewYang), TWITTER (Aug. 7, 2019, 5:44 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/AndrewYang/status/1159082916007202816. 
 35. Creola Johnson, Credentialism and the Proliferation of Fake Degrees: The Employer 
Pretends to Need a Degree; The Employee Pretends to Have One, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 269, 298 (2006); see also Paul Schmitz, Lessons from famous college dropouts, CNN 
(Dec. 31, 2011, 2:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2011/12/30/opinion/schmitz-college/in-
dex.html (detailing a list of accomplished persons who never earned college degrees). 
 36. D. Watkins, What happens to the young basketball stars who don’t go pro?, SALON 
(May 4, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2019/05/04/when-the-angel-investors-of-
the-street-ball-court-come-to-collect/. 
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recruits and other corruptive acts.37  Use of “street agent” thus casts the 
person’s lack of education as suggestive of unscrupulous qualities. 
Many commentators explicitly linked their critiques of a college 
degree requirement to race.  Fox Sports commentator Chris Broussard 
bluntly labeled the requirement as “racist.”38  Commentators observed 
that many NBPA-certified agents eschewed higher education.39  They 
gained relevant experience by working with players and, in that forum, 
honing their abilities. 
The college degree requirement was perceived as an attempt by the 
NCAA to keep so-called “street agents” from advising college players.40  
In that light, many perceived the requirement as racially insensitive.41  
Compounding the issue of race is that African American players dispro-
portionately comprise the population of American players who generate 
the most revenue for the NCAA and who are most likely to be selected 
in the NBA draft.42  Approximately eighty-five percent of the NCAA’s 
revenue derives from the annual tournament for men’s college basket-
ball, a sport where more than half of the players are African American.43  
African American players also comprise the largest demographic group 
of players selected within the “lottery” (top) portion of the NBA draft.44  
In the 2019 NBA draft, twelve of the first fourteen picks were African 
 
 37. Watkins, supra note 36; see Michael Wilbon, The ‘One-and-Done’ Song and Dance, 
WASH. POST (June 25, 2009), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2009/06/24/AR2009062403396_pf.html (noting that “street agents” are associated with 
corrupting youth basketball). 
 38. Jack Winter, FOX Sports’ Chris Broussard says NCAA’s ‘Rich Paul Rule’ is racist, 
CLUTCHPOINTS (Aug. 7, 2019), https://clutchpoints.com/nba-news-chris-broussard-says-
ncaas-rich-paul-rule-is-racist/. 
 39. Mark Schlabach, NCAA amends ‘Rich Paul Rule’ amid blowback, ESPN.COM (Aug. 
12, 2019), https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/27374124/ncaa-
amends-rich-paul-rule-amid-blowback (referring to some NBA agents having not gone to col-
lege). 
 40. See, e.g., Scott Harris, Is The NCAA Just Trying To Eliminate The Street Agent?, 
BEAT OF SPORTS (Aug. 9, 2019), https://969thegame.iheart.com/content/2019-08-09-is-the-
ncaa-just-trying-to-eliminate-the-street-agent/ (describing suspicions in the basketball com-
munity that the NCAA is attempting to eliminate opportunities for interaction between certain 
agents and college athletes). 
 41. Alex Galbrath, Why NBA Fans Are Calling out NCAA’s Reported New Agent Re-
strictions, COMPLEX (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.complex.com/sports/2019/08/ncaa-agents-
restrictions-reactions. 
 42. See ED O’BANNON & MICHAEL MCCANN, COURT JUSTICE: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
MY BATTLE AGAINST THE NCAA 88 (2018). 
 43. See Nick Moyle, Emmert discusses FBI probe, what makes San Antonio special Final 
Four host, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.express-
news.com/sports/colleges/article/Emmert-discusses-FBI-probe-what-makes-San-
12782587.php (noting revenue for the NCAA); see also infra Section III (providing demo-
graphic data on NCAA athletes). 
 44. NBA.com Staff, 2019 NBA Draft results: Picks 1-60, NBA (June 21, 2019, 2:55 
AM), https://www.nba.com/article/2019/06/21/2019-nba-draft-results-picks-1-60. 
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American players.45  The exclusion of agents denies players the chance 
to gain representation from many agents who are deemed qualified by 
the NBPA and are clearly adept at their work. 
After hearing critical commentary, the NCAA abruptly tabled the 
college degree requirement.46  This was striking on a number of levels, 
most notably that the NCAA seldom pivots from its positions—even in 
the face of intense condemnation.47 
The college degree requirement is not the only source of contro-
versy for the NCAA’s proposed certification criteria.  Commentators 
have also criticized other NCAA certification criteria.  For example, the 
NCAA announced that it would only certify agents who (1) have been 
certified by the NBPA for at least three consecutive years and (2) pass 
an in-person NCAA qualification exam.48  The “experiential” require-
ment would exclude newer and younger agents. Such agents are thought 
to include a disproportionate percentage of African Americans.49  Many 
of these agents are also without NBA player clients.  According to a re-
cent survey by The New York Times, sixty percent of NBPA-licensed 
agents do not represent any NBA players.50  In contrast, a relatively small 
number of NBPA-licensed agents represent a disproportionately high 
percentage of NBA players: nine agents represent twenty-five percent of 
players and twenty-seven agents represent fifty percent of players.51  
These data reflect the increasingly common practice of NBA players to 
be represented by “super agencies.”52  These well-funded firms, such as 
Creative Artists Agency or Wasserman, provide numerous services to 
clients and position them to land opportunities in the entertainment in-
dustry.53  Newly certified NBPA agents often can’t compete with this 
range of services, leaving them without clients and discouraged about 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Michael Shapiro, NCAA Amends ‘Rich Paul Rule’, Won’t Require Agents to Have 
Bachelor’s Degree, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.si.com/college-bas-
ketball/2019/08/12/ncaa-agent-requirements-bachelors-degree-rich-paul-rule. 
 47. See ROGER ABRAMS, SPORTS JUSTICE: THE LAW AND THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 73 
(2010) (maintaining that the NCAA engages in an inflexible administration of rules). 
 48. NCAA, supra note 6. 
 49. Jemele Hill, The NCAA Doesn’t Speak for College Athletes, ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/ncaa-puts-squeeze-black-
agents/596041/. 
 50. Kevin Draper, Congratulations, You’re a Certified N.B.A. Agent. Good Luck Finding 
a Client, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/sports/nba-
agents.html. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Jason Gershwin, Will Professional Athletes Continue to Choose Their Represen-
tation Freely? An Examination of the Enforceability of Non-Compete Agreements Against 
Sports Agents, 5 BUS. L. 585, 586 (2003). 
 53. Matthew Blake, CAA Scores for Athletes, LA BUS. J., Aug. 30, 2019, https://labusi-
nessjournal.com/news/2019/aug/30/caa-scores-athletes/. 
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their chances.  Those who do manage to gain a foothold sometimes find 
themselves “loaning” money to their clients and clients’ family mem-
bers, while continuously worrying those clients will be poached by the 
super agencies.54 
As an added source of pressure, even if an NBPA-licensed agent 
has retained clients, the agent needs to negotiate an employment contract 
with an NBA team.  Under NBPA rules, an agent is subject to losing his 
or her license if the agent does not negotiate a player contract with an 
NBA team at least once every five years.55  This means an agent who 
secures clients whose talent level only attracts the interest of teams in 
Europe or Asia, or only the NBA’s minor league (the G League), will 
eventually find himself or herself up against the five-year mark. 
In September 2019, another line of agent opposition to the NCAA’s 
proposed rules surfaced.56  According to The Athletic’s Shams Charania, 
a group of NBA agents intend to boycott the taking of NCAA in-person 
examinations.57  These agents, who were not named, contend that they 
should not have to take an exam administered by the NCAA when they 
already passed one administered by the NBPA.58  As of April 2020, only 
twenty-four NBPA-certified agents had pursued NCAA certification 
whereas hundreds had taken no action.59 
These numerous criticisms of NCAA’s proposed rules raise crucial 
questions about prerequisites for agent representation in college sports 
and, more broadly, limitations on employment in the modern workplace.  
The NCAA pledges to continually evaluate its pending agent require-
ments,60 but is self-review sufficient to protect student athletes and 
agents from the harms described in these criticisms?  Should the NCAA 
prohibit college basketball players from gaining the advice of agents 
who may be of a similar age and perhaps seem more relatable?  Should 
an agent’s lack of experience in representing NBA players automatically 
 
 54. Alex Kennedy, An inside look at the stressful, chaotic lives of NBA agents, 
HOOPSHYPE (May 8, 2017), https://hoopshype.com/2017/05/08/an-inside-look-at-the-stress-
ful-chaotic-lives-of-nba-agents/. 
 55. NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 16, at 22. 
 56. Jason Owens, Report: Agencies to boycott NCAA demands that agents take tests tied 
to ‘Rich Paul rule,’ YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 5, 2019, 4:41 PM), https://sports.yahoo.com/re-
port-agencies-to-boycott-ncaa-demands-that-agents-take-mandatory-testing-tied-to-rich-
paul-rule-234128921.html. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Brad Spain, Testing The NBA Draft Waters Will Be Much More Difficult For Pro-
spects, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Apr. 6, 2020), http://sportsagentblog.com/2020/04/06/testing-
the-nba-draft-waters-will-be-much-more-difficult-for-prospects/. 
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foreclose him or her from advising college students about the choice be-
tween staying in school or turning pro?  Could agents who are excluded 
by the NCAA pursue an antitrust claim and maintain that they have been 
unlawfully boycotted?  Alternatively, could they explore a claim under 
Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and insist that the 
NCAA’s agent rule unlawfully discriminates on the bases of race and 
sex? 
II. THE NCAA AND ITS UNIQUE BRAND OF “PROTECTING” COLLEGE 
ATHLETES 
The NCAA and sports agents are not a necessary pairing.  A brief 
retelling of the NCAA’s history evidences that point.  The NCAA is a 
not-for-profit entity that governs most college sports in the U.S.61  Its 
membership includes 1,098 colleges and 102 athletic conferences.62  The 
NCAA was founded in 1906 at the urging of President Theodore Roose-
velt. Roosevelt was dismayed by the deaths of college football players.63  
He demanded that college presidents join hands to develop safety rules.64  
Stated differently, the NCAA wasn’t conceived to foreclose compensa-
tion opportunities for student athletes or to draw purported lines between 
amateur and professional sports but to protect the physical health and 
safety of college athletes. 
Over time, the NCAA would acquire other functions far afield from 
player safety.  Among them is the enforcement of “amateurism,” a term 
coined to describe NCAA rules that attempt to distinguish college ath-
letes from professional athletes.65  To that end, the NCAA’s Manual de-
fines the “principle of amateurism” as stressing “student-athletes shall 
be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be 
motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social 
benefits to be derived . . . student-athletes should be protected from ex-
ploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”66  A hallmark of 
 
 61. NCAA, WHERE DOES THE MONEY GO?, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/fi-
nances (last visited Aug. 24, 2020). 
 62. NCAA, WHAT IS THE NCAA?, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-cen-
ter/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Aug. 24, 2020). 
 63. Neil Gibson, NCAA Scholarship Restrictions as Anticompetitive Measures: The One-
Year Rule and Scholarship Caps as Avenues for Antitrust Society, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. 
REV. 203, 211 (2012); see also JOHN J. MILLER, THE BIG SCRUM: HOW TEDDY ROOSEVELT 
SAVED FOOTBALL (2011) (offering a comprehensive account of the relationship between 
President Roosevelt and college sports). 
 64. Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for a New 
Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487, 490-91 (1995). 
 65. Richard Morrison, Price Fixing Among Elite Colleges and Universities, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 807, 821-22 (1992). 
 66. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2.9. 
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amateurism is the “student-athlete,” a moniker imagined by the NCAA 
in the 1950s.67  It was created as a litigation device in legal proceedings 
where players and former players argued that they were university em-
ployees within the meaning of state workers’ compensation statutes.68  
The term explicitly labeled the players as “students,” a designation 
which enabled universities to evade the reach of those statutes.69 
The supposed separation of college athletes from professional 
sports has been the subject of much incredulity and litigation.  The com-
mercialization of college sports has often blurred meaningful demarca-
tions between “amateur” and “professional.”  The NCAA, along with 
coaches, athletic department staff, network executives, and numerous 
others—save for the players—earn considerably from college sports.  
The NCAA, for instance, receives approximately $800 million each year 
in revenue from the Division I Men’s Basketball Tournament, better 
known as NCAA March Madness.70  This is up from just $1 million in 
1973 and $9 million in 1980.71  The salaries of head coaches in the 
“Power Five” conferences, which represent the highest level of college 
football in the U.S., is also telling.72  Their average annual salary is $3.9 
million.73  High coaching salaries extend well beyond football.  Among 
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Power Five public colleges, head coaches in twenty-three sports other 
than football, men’s basketball, and women’s basketball saw their com-
pensation increase by forty-three percent from 2013 to 2018, with many 
earning in excess of $300,000 per year.74  These salaries far exceed fac-
ulty and, in many cases, senior university administrators.75  In fact, in 
forty of the fifty states, the highest-paid public employee is a coach at a 
state university rather than the governor or highest-ranking public health 
official.76  There is no shortage of data points which communicate the 
same message: college sports constitute a big business. 
Meanwhile, serious questions have been raised about the quality of 
education provided to student-athletes.  Researchers have found that ath-
letic departments routinely engage in “academic clustering,” whereby 
they direct student-athletes to enroll in majors and other disciplines that 
are relatively easy and that feature courses that would not interfere with 
athletic commitments.77  Researchers have also discovered that many 
students who play football or basketball can only read up to an eighth-
grade level.78  Other studies have found the reading level of college ath-
letes can be as low as a fourth-grade level.79  Some college athletes are 
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Critics have likewise rebuked the NCAA for its measurement of 
student-athlete graduation rates.81  Using the “Graduation Success Rate” 
(GSR) statistic that it introduced in 2002, the NCAA insists that Division 
I athletes graduated at eighty-eight percent in 2018, a fourteen percent 
increase from 2002 and a higher graduation rate than students who aren’t 
athletes.82  On the surface, the NCAA has seemingly succeeded in en-
suring academic success.  The devil is in the details, namely the manner 
in which GSR is constructed.  GSR omits a large data set of student ath-
letes who transfer to another college.83  Of transferees, only about one-
third are included in graduation rates at their new colleges.84  Studies 
indicate that approximately sixteen percent of all student-athletes are not 
counted in GSR figures.85  This reveals that GSR offers a misleadingly 
favorable take on the propensity of student-athletes to graduate. 
Individual universities have been implicated in particularly irksome 
controversies involving the education—or lack thereof—of athletes.  In 
2017, the NCAA confirmed that the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill (UNC) had offered “fake courses” to students.86  The courses 
generally involved no teaching.87  Students would submit papers at the 
end of the semester and those papers would be graded easily.88  These 
courses were offered over a twenty-year-period, with 3,100 students en-
rolling in them.89  Of those students, forty-seven were student-athletes, 
about half of whom were football players.90  The NCAA investigated 
UNC for failing to adequately monitor student-athletes’ course work.91  
In a report, the NCAA concluded that the courses betrayed any logical 
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conception of “academic freedom” and traveled into the domain of aca-
demic fraud.92 
The NCAA nonetheless declined to punish UNC since the courses 
were available to the student body at large, rather than only to student-
athletes.93  From that lens, the NCAA reasoned, there was no “systemic 
effort to impermissibly benefit student-athletes.”94  This distinction, 
while empirically true, highlights the relative ease by which a university 
can lessen the burdens of college courses so that athletes can focus on 
athletics and not run afoul of the NCAA eligibility requirements. 
UNC is hardly the only school to orchestrate academic policies that 
prioritize athletic achievements at the expense of academic integrity.  In 
2019, a tutor to student-athletes at the University of Missouri at Colum-
bia was found to have taken online courses for twelve of the student-
athletes she tutored.95  A similar finding was made that year at Missis-
sippi State University, where a tutor took exams and completed online 
course assignments for members of the football and men’s basketball 
teams.96  Given that the cheating had occurred for the specific benefit of 
college athletes, the NCAA sanctioned both schools for academic mis-
conduct.97  These examples illuminate the incongruity of “big time” col-
lege sports, where athletes are expected to function as de facto employ-
ees of their teams while somehow meeting the academic requirements of 
full-time students.  Illustratively, during courtroom testimony in 2014, 
former UCLA basketball star Ed O’Bannon bluntly observed he “was an 
athlete masquerading as a student.”98 
The integrity of college academics has also been implicated in crim-
inal prosecutions of college basketball coaches, sneaker company exec-
utives, and sports marketing professionals.  In trials in 2018, a group of 
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such persons were found guilty of conspiracy and wire and bank fraud.99  
They conspired in a “pay-for-play” scheme whereby they wired money 
to families of top recruits.100  In exchange, the recruits agreed to attend 
colleges with teams sponsored by Adidas.101  After these players turned 
pro at the conclusion of their collegiate experience, the bribe made them 
more inclined to sign endorsement deals with Adidas.102  The players 
involved often spent only a semester and a half as college students.103  
That is, they played a season of college basketball, which runs from No-
vember to February or March, and then dropped out after their season 
ended in the spring semester.  They did so to prepare for the NBA 
draft.104  The prosecutions underscore how college can have little to do 
with education when the student is marketable to his or her school. 
In a different light, the so-called “Operation Varsity Blues” scandal 
reveals how college athletics can be manipulated to procure the admis-
sions to children of parents who bribe coaches.105  The twist with Oper-
ation Varsity Blues is that the athletes were themselves “fake.”106  They 
lacked the requisite academic credentials to be admitted into such 
schools as Stanford University, Georgetown University and the Univer-
sity of Southern California, and they weren’t star athletes, either.107  But 
they held one (decidedly unearned) comparative advantage: their parents 
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were wealthy and willing to cheat the system.108  To that end, the parents 
bribed college coaches, who then falsely portrayed the applicants to ad-
missions officers as coveted student-athletes whose contributions to the 
university would outweigh their middling academic talents.109  The ad-
missions officers were then more inclined to admit the students who 
would matriculate as supposed student-athletes.110  Operation Varsity 
Blues is further evidence that college athletics and college education of-
ten operate on separate tracks but when those tracks merge, suspicions 
ought to be raised. 
Meanwhile, the NCAA has refrained from adopting measures that 
would enlarge its authority over academic fraud.  In 2019, the NCAA 
rejected a proposed bylaw that would have made member schools ac-
countable “for activities or conduct that clearly demonstrates a disregard 
for academic integrity as it relates to student-athletes.”111  In private con-
versations, university leaders expressed concerns about conveying such 
authority to the NCAA over academic matters.112  It is perplexing that as 
the NCAA plans to impose agent requirements that raise legal and social 
policy concerns, it has abandoned proposed reforms that are designed to 
combat academic shams. 
III. CHALLENGES TO AMATEURISM AND IMPACT ON AGENT 
CERTIFICATION 
There have been three major legal challenges to amateurism over 
the last fifteen years.  Each has impacted the NCAA’s capacity to control 
the access of representation to college athletes. 
A. Ed O’Bannon Proves Amateurism Violates Federal Antitrust Law 
While NCAA Pledges to Reform Name, Image and Likeness Policies 
The first major challenge was raised by Ed O’Bannon.113  In 2009, 
O’Bannon was a thirty-six-year-old retired NBA player and a married 
father of three living comfortably in a Las Vegas suburb.114  A former 
college basketball superstar and top NBA draft pick, O’Bannon had 
earned millions of dollars playing for NBA teams and later for European 
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teams.  His basketball career would end at age thirty-two after multiple 
knee surgeries.115  O’Bannon is highly recognizable in the sports indus-
try, in part because of the national profile he gained in 1995.116  It was 
during that year when O’Bannon was awarded college basketball’s 
player of the year at UCLA, which he had led to a national champion-
ship.117  He appeared on the Jay Leno Show118 and the sitcom Hope & 
Gloria,119 and visited with President Bill Clinton at the White House.120  
He was also featured on the cover of Sports Illustrated.121  O’Bannon 
was, in every sense of the phrase, a basketball legend.  Yet by 2009, 
O’Bannon was long past basketball stardom.122  He was thus surprised 
to see that the video game publisher Electronic Arts (“EA”) had featured 
him and other former players as digital “avatars” in a new college bas-
ketball video game that had been licensed by the NCAA and sold for 
sixty dollars a copy.123   
Granted, O’Bannon’s name wasn’t present in the game, but O’Ban-
non’s jersey number, height, weight, race and talents were nonetheless 
present.124  EA hoped that removing the names would create the illusion 
of avatars’ anonymity though later, in pretrial discovery, it was revealed 
that EA had stripped the game of players’ names right before publica-
tion.125  Video game players could also edit the avatars to contain the 
basketball players’ names—and, as luck would have it, an announcer in 
the game would then say those names.126  The avatar, then, clearly rep-
resented O’Bannon. 
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O’Bannon had never given permission for his image and likeness 
to appear in the game.127  He soon filed a complaint in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California against the NCAA and EA, 
arguing that they had violated his right of publicity under California law 
and Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.128  O’Bannon’s core argu-
ment was that the defendants had prevented him and other former col-
lege players from negotiating the commercial use of their names, images 
and likenesses in video games, trading cards, apparel and re-broadcasts 
of “classic games.”129 
In this context, the individual members of the NCAA—the colleges 
and conferences—constitute the competing businesses.  They are subject 
to the Section 1 requirement that they not constrain competition in ways 
that are more anti-competitive than procompetitive.130  As O’Bannon ar-
gued, these competing colleges and conferences had conspired to set the 
value available to college players for use of their identities at zero dol-
lars.131  O’Bannon’s complaint was eventually certified as a class ac-
tion.132 
O’Bannon stressed the troubling racial implications of rules de-
signed to deprive players of licensing revenue from the use of their 
names and likenesses.133  He emphasized that the vast majority of reve-
nue generated through NCAA sports is derived from Division I men’s 
basketball and Division I Football Bowl Subdivision football, both of 
which are comprised mostly of Black players.134  Revenue generated 
through these players’ labor, names, images and likenesses primarily 
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benefits coaching staffs, athletic departments and university leader-
ships.135   
In response to O’Bannon’s arguments, the NCAA asserted that his 
claims were barred by amateurism, specifically its prohibition of college 
athletes receiving compensation other than reimbursement for tuition, 
room, board, books and related costs of education.136  The NCAA drew 
on the language of U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, who 
in 1984 held that 
the NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradi-
tion of amateurism in college sports . . . there can be no question but 
that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or that the preservation 
of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity 
to intercollegiate athletics.137 
This oft-cited passage from NCAA vs. Board of Regents is routinely 
used to profess that amateurism exempts the NCAA from the normal 
rigors of antitrust scrutiny.138  In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court 
held that while antitrust laws forbid the NCAA from restricting colleges’ 
television contracts, the NCAA implicitly enjoyed the right to restrain 
competition in other ways—including through the prohibition of college 
athlete pay.139 
Justice Byron White, who remains the only person to have served 
on the highest court in the land and play in the NFL, offered a memorable 
dissent in Board of Regents.140  In it, he warned of a future college sports 
landscape where commercialization would easily eclipse education.141  
Thirty-six years later, Justice White’s admonition has proven prophetic.  
Each year billions of dollars are spent on broadcasts, licenses, arenas, 
facilities, coaches, trainers, and numerous other beneficiaries orbiting 
the lives of unpaid college athletes.142  Colleges can recruit athletes by 
spending on virtually everything around the athlete, but not on the 
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athlete himself or herself.143  This framework has led to spending wars 
between colleges with major athletics programs, where they are free to 
compete except through direct payment to recruits.144 
O’Bannon prevailed, albeit in a targeted way.  He negotiated a set-
tlement with EA whereby EA agreed to pay about $40 million to more 
than 29,000 current and former players.145  These players received a 
check worth up to $7,200, depending on the number of times they ap-
peared in video games.146  O’Bannon also defeated the NCAA in court. 
U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken held that, under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, the NCAA and its members cannot conspire to use college 
players’ names, images and likenesses in video games and other com-
mercial products without their consent.147  The victory was constrained 
on appeal, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit limited 
the remedy.148  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that colleges can 
comply with Section 1 by being able to provide up to the full cost of 
attendance—an amount that is normally between $3,000 and $6,000 per 
academic year and reflects cost of living and other factors.149 
The NCAA has not changed its core rules denying players the right 
to negotiate contracts with third parties, be they video game publishers 
or clothing manufacturers, for the use of those players’ names, images, 
and likenesses (“NIL”).150  One such rule is Bylaw 12 of the NCAA’s 
Division I Manual.151  It warns that a college student becomes ineligible 
for any sport if, after enrolling in college, he or she accepts pay for pro-
moting a product or service or allows his or her name or picture to be 
 
 143. See LeRoy D. Clark, New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College Athlet-
ics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 HOW. L.J. 259, 272 (1993) (explaining how college athletes 
comprise the one group in the college sports economy without an organization designed to 
ensure access to benefits). 
 144. See Mark Schlabach, Inside Georgia’s $200 million quest to take down Alabama, 
ESPN (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/27647608/inside-
georgia-200-million-quest-take-alabama (illustrating a spending war between the football 
programs for the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama). 
 145. O’BANNON & MCCANN, supra note 42, at 167; SI Wire, Judge approves $60 million 
video games settlement, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 17, 2015), https://www.si.com/col-
lege/2015/07/17/ncaa-video-game-60-million-settlement. 
 146. O’BANNON & MCCANN, supra note 42, at 167. 
 147. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 148. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 149. Id.; see also Michael McCann, Why the NCAA Lost Its Latest Landmark Case in the 
Battle Over What Schools Can Offer Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.si.com/college/2019/03/09/ncaa-antitrust-lawsuit-claudia-wilken-alston-jenkins 
(discussing range of typical full cost of living stipend); Michael McCann, What’s Next After 
California Signs Game Changer Fair Pay to Play Act Into Law?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 
30, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/09/30/fair-pay-to-play-act-law-ncaa-california-
pac-12 (noting inputs for full cost of attendance) [hereinafter McCann, What’s Next]. 
 150. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, § 12. 
 151. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, § 12.5.2.1. 
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used for promoting a product or service.152  Ineligibility in a sport is more 
consequential than merely sitting out games and practices.  It endangers 
a student-athlete’s scholarship, the loss of which could make attending 
college financially unaffordable for the student-athlete.153 
In October 2019, the NCAA signaled openness to revisiting its 
longstanding opposition towards student-athletes licensing their NIL.154  
The NCAA announced it is contemplating concepts to provide “oppor-
tunities” for college athletes to “benefit” from the licensing of their iden-
tities in ways that are consistent with amateurism.155  It is unclear 
whether such opportunities would authorize pay and, if so, how or 
whether payments would be restricted.156 
For instance, student athletes might be able to sign endorsement 
deals or group licensing contracts and accrue earnings while they play 
college sports, but they would need to exhaust their NCAA eligibility 
before gaining permission to receive payments.  Another possibility is 
that student-athletes would be able to spend NIL earnings pursuant to 
highly restricted terms.  For example, they might be limited to purchases 
of items that meet qualifying “academic” conditions, such as goods sold 
in the college bookstore. 
Compliance officers at schools might also be empowered to ap-
prove or reject a student-athlete’s pending endorsement deal. Imagine a 
student-athlete enrolled at a religiously affiliated university.  Now envi-
sion this student-athlete wishing to sign an endorsement deal with a com-
pany that espouses values which conflict with those of the university and 
its mission.  It is conceivable that this “opportunity to benefit” would be 
rejected. 
 
 152. Id. (instructing that college athletes are barred from both accepting “any remunera-
tion for or permits the use of his or her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote 
directly the sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind” and receiving “remu-
neration for endorsing a commercial product or service through the individual’s use of such 
product or service”). 
 153. See Benjamin A. Menzel, Heading Down the Wrong Road?: Why Deregulating Am-
ateurism May Cause Future Legal Problems for the NCAA, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 857, 
866 (2002) (discussing how a prospective student-athlete can lose the award of a scholarship 
if he or she is later deemed ineligible). 
 154. Board of Governors starts process to enhance name, image and likeness opportuni-
ties, NCAA (Oct. 29, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-cen-
ter/news/board-governors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities 
[hereinafter Board of Governors starts process]. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Michael McCann, Key Questions, Takeaways From the NCAA’s NIL Announcement, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/30/ncaa-name-
image-likeness-announcement-takeaways-questions [hereinafter McCann, Key Questions]. 
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Notably, the NCAA’s announcement omitted reference to college 
players being able to hire agents, a practice long barred by the NCAA.157  
Denying college players the ability to hire agents would limit players’ 
access to the agents’ expertise in business dealings and negotiation of 
NIL contracts.158 
In April 2020, the NCAA announced that its Board of Governors—
the highest governing body of college sports—supports modification of 
existing NCAA rules in order to permit college players to sign endorse-
ment deals.159  Although rule changes have not been adopted, it is ex-
pected that college players will be able to receive endorsement compen-
sation while in school.160  However, the Board of Governors opposes 
group licensing for college athletes in the short-term and remains silent 
on the question of agents.161  The three divisions of college sports, Divi-
sion I, II and III, are expected to adopt rules by January 2021, with 
changes going into effect at the start of the 2021-22 academic year.162 
B. College Athletes not Declared Employees but Landscape is Shifting 
The second major challenge to amateurism in college sports oc-
curred in 2014 when a group of Northwestern University football players 
petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) for recognition 
as employees.163  The players argued that their collegiate experience was 
tantamount to an employee-employer existence.164  They stressed that 
they devoted between fifty and sixty hours per week to football-related 
activities, including playing, traveling, practicing, and training.165 
 
 157. Board of Governors starts process, supra note 154. 
 158. McCann, Key Questions, supra note 156. 
 159. Board of Governors moves toward allowing student-athlete compensation for en-
dorsements and promotions, NCAA (Apr. 29, 2020, 8:30 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/re-
sources/media-center/news/board-governors-moves-toward-allowing-student-athlete-com-
pensation-endorsements-and-promotions [hereinafter Board of Governors moves toward 
allowing student-athlete compensation]. 
 160. Michael McCann, Legal Challenges Await After NCAA Shifts on Athletes’ Name, 
Image and Likeness Rights, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.si.com/col-
lege/2020/04/29/ncaa-name-image-likeness-changes-legal-analysis [hereinafter McCann, Le-
gal Challenges Await]. 
 161. Board of Governors moves toward allowing student-athlete compensation, supra 
note 159; Ross Dellenger, Group Licensing Is the Key to the Return of NCAA Video Games–
So What’s the Holdup?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 5, 2020), https://www.si.com/col-
lege/2020/05/05/ncaa-football-video-game-return-group-licensing. 
 162. Board of Governors moves toward allowing student-athlete compensation, supra 
note 159. 
 163. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 1350 (2015). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 1358; see also George J. Bivens, NCAA Student Athlete Unionization: NLRB 
Punts on Northwestern University Football Team, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 949, 967-69 (2017) 
(detailing the players’ rationales). 
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Further, Northwestern football players’ management of time while 
functioning as college students—including which courses they took—
was prioritized on account of obligations to the team.166  This led the 
players to compare themselves to graduate teaching assistants, who have 
been recognized as employees under the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”).167  Both college athletes and graduate teaching assistants en-
joy a multipurpose relationship with their universities in that both func-
tion as students and workers.  This hybrid relationship could mean they 
are owed minimum wage, overtime pay, and other benefits accorded to 
more conventional categories of workers.168 
The five-member NLRB unanimously declined to exercise jurisdic-
tion and therefore dismissed the players’ petition.169  The NLRB rea-
soned that it would be inappropriate to render a decision in light of “the 
situation of scholarship players” being subject to “change in the near fu-
ture.”170  The NLRB also suggested that it “would not promote stability 
in labor relations” if players at public universities, which are governed 
by state law, are employees whereas those at private universities, which 
are governed by the NLRA, are not.171  The NLRB’s unwillingness to 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to college athletes surprised some ob-
servers of the NLRB, particularly since the NLRB had ruled on the sim-
ilar question of whether graduate assistants and teaching assistants at 
both public and private universities ought to be classified as employ-
ees.172 
The Northwestern decision does not change the potential value of 
agents to college athletes.  Those athletes could gain from the advocacy 
and strategy of seasoned business professionals in regard to when, and 
if, to turn pro—and, should college athletes obtain NIL rights, how to 
 
 166. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167. 
 167. See Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 65, 72-75 (2014). 
 168. See generally McCormick & McCormick, supra note 68 (advocating that college 
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 169. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 at 1350. 
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 171. Id.; see also Michael McCann, Breaking down implications of NLRB ruling on North-
western players union, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.si.com/college-
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negotiate endorsement and licensing contracts.  Further, the decision 
does not foreclose the possibility that students at public universities 
could pursue employee status under respective state laws.  Although the 
NLRA governs private employers—including private universities—
public employers are governed by state laws.  As commentators have 
noted, certain states’ labor laws appear more favorable to recognition of 
college athletes as employees than does the NLRA.173 
While college athletes have been unable to gain recognition as uni-
versity employees, they have used litigation to narrow the scope of 
NCAA restrictions on student compensation from universities.  This is 
most apparent in Alston v. NCAA, also known as the Grant-in-Aid Cap 
Antitrust Litigation.174  The case concerned the legality of college pro-
grams adhering to amateurism rules that cap the value of athletic schol-
arships to tuition, room, board and books to levels consistent with other 
students at the school.175  The plaintiffs contended that athletic scholar-
ships should be priced in accordance with the competitive marketplace 
of universities’ athletic programs competing against one another.176  Put 
more concretely, if several top college football programs recruit the same 
high school star athlete, those schools—which are competing busi-
nesses—should be precluded from colluding, through amateurism, to 
cap how much they can offer in athletic scholarships.177  Competitive 
bidding should occur, particularly in light of competition in numerous 
other facets of the game, including with respect to salaries of coaches 
and stadium amenities. 
Following a bench trial in late 2018, Judge Wilken permanently re-
strained the NCAA from agreeing to limit education benefits for student-
athletes when those benefits are related to “computers, science equip-
ment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the 
cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of 
academic studies.”178  In addition, the NCAA will be barred from 
 
 173. See, e.g., Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete Players Unions: Lessons 
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denying expenses spent on tutoring.179  However, Judge Wilken’s ruling 
permits the NCAA to prohibit “cash for grades” and similar pay instru-
ments in that the NCAA can continue to restrict academic or graduation 
awards and related incentives that are linked to pay.180  The NCAA has 
appealed the ruling, which has been stayed pending appeal.181 
C. The Fallout of California Enacting the Fair Pay to Play Act 
The third challenge to amateurism is one that could significantly 
impact agents.  California is the first of several states which have or are 
likely to adopt a statute that requires colleges to permit their student ath-
letes to hire agents and negotiate the commercial use of their NIL.182  In 
September 2019, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed the Fair 
Pay to Play Act.183  The Act, which goes into effect in 2023, empowers 
athletes enrolled at California universities to hire agents, sign endorse-
ment deals, negotiate for inclusion in video games, enter into contracts 
with apparel companies, and sponsor camps in exchange for financial 
compensation.184  For that reason, it largely takes O’Bannon’s victory 
and enshrines it in California law.  Legislators in Florida, Illinois, New 
York, South Carolina, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Colorado, Kentucky, and 
Minnesota have proposed, or plan to propose, similar bills.185 
California’s Act is nonetheless vulnerable to arguments that it 
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8 of the U.S. Constitution.186  In general, the Commerce Clause empow-
ers Congress with the exclusive power to regulate interstate com-
merce.187  In interpreting the Commerce Clause, courts have identified a 
“Dormant Commerce Clause,” a judicial interpretation that states are 
barred from regulating the economy in ways that would significantly im-
pact the economies of other states.188 
The NCAA used the Commerce Clause to defeat an attempt by the 
State of Nevada to empower college students and college administrators 
with more procedural rights than were recognized by the NCAA.189  In 
the early 1990s, Nevada adopted a series of measures in response to the 
NCAA sanctioning the University of Nevada at Las Vegas in a much-
publicized basketball recruiting scandal.190  One measure required that 
athletic association disciplinary hearings must be conducted by an “im-
partial” tribunal.191  This policy conflicted with NCAA rules, which gave 
authority to discipline to the NCAA’s own Committee on Infractions.192 
In NCAA v. Miller,193 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that Nevada’s attempts to add due process protections that ex-
ceeded those enjoyed by NCAA member schools in other states inter-
fered with the NCAA’s capacity to establish national and uniform 
rules.194  Judge Ferdinand Fernandez highlighted Nevada’s added pro-
tections would necessarily compel the NCAA to change its national rules 
to comport to those in Nevada.195  This is because, as a national govern-
ing entity, the NCAA needs to treat member schools equally.196 
 
 186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 34 Cal. 3d 
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In opposing the Fair Pay to Play Act, the NCAA is also poised to 
draw support from the California Supreme Court’s 1983 ruling in Partee 
v. San Diego Chargers.197  In Partee, an NFL player challenged collec-
tively bargained rules concerning hours, wages, and other working con-
ditions of NFL players.198  Those rules were exempt from scrutiny under 
Section I of the Sherman Act due to the non-statutory labor exemption.199  
The exemption adheres to a series of Supreme Court decisions which 
collectively instruct that when management and labor bargain workplace 
rules, those rules—irrespective of whether they could be termed “anti-
competitive”—ought to fall outside the scope of Section I.200  The ex-
emption is premised on the idea that labor and management should be 
rewarded for collaborating on the creation of workplace arrangements.201 
Dennis Partee insisted that collectively bargained rules can still vi-
olate California’s state antitrust law, known as the Cartwright Act, when 
those rules unduly constrain players’ earning opportunities.202  This is 
true, Partee insisted, when competing NFL teams agree to not tamper.203  
In the sports industry, “tampering” refers to officials of one team con-
tacting players who are employed by other teams to let them know they 
are interested in hiring them.204  “Tampering” has a negative 
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connotation.  For one, it derives from the word “tamper,” which Mer-
riam-Webster defines as “to interfere so as to weaken or change for the 
worse.”205  Tampering also elicits criticism from league officials as ob-
structing their efforts to assure fans that teams respect one another.206  
Yet viewed from a different light, “tampering” is merely a pejorative 
word for healthy competition amongst employers for the services of 
skilled employees.207  While leagues frown upon such competition—
”tampering”—the U.S. Department of Justice has opined that “no 
poach” agreements among competing employers are presumed unlawful 
under federal antitrust law.208  Such agreements diminish the freedom of 
movement for workers.209 
Courts have not resolved whether a prohibition on tampering in pro-
fessional sports violates the Cartwright Act.  The Cartwright Act largely 
mimics the Sherman Act but is “broader in range and deeper in reach.”210  
The non-statutory labor exemption does not govern state antitrust laws 
and thus does not apply to the Cartwright Act.211  Furthermore, the 
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Sherman Act does not preempt state antitrust laws.212  Those factors re-
flected favorably on Partee’s case. 
The California Supreme Court, however, declined to consider 
whether a Cartwright Act violation had occurred.213  The court held that 
application of the Cartwright Act in the context of collectively bargained 
policies would unreasonably burden interstate commerce and thus vio-
late the Commerce Clause.214  Writing for the Court, Justice Allen 
Broussard enunciated reasoning that resembles the logic of Judge Fer-
nandez offered in Miller a decade later.  Broussard stressed that the NFL 
cannot effectively function as a national entity in the absence of harmo-
nious policies.215  “The necessity of a nationwide league structure for the 
benefit of teams and players for effective competition,” Broussard ob-
served, “is evident as is the need for a nationally uniform set of rules.”216  
In that same vein, Broussard warned that should California accord new 
rights to NFL players employed by NFL franchises, the NFL would be 
shoehorned into offering those rights to all NFL players: “Fragmentation 
of the league structure on the basis of state lines would adversely affect 
the success of the competitive business enterprise, and differing state an-
titrust decisions if applied to the enterprise would likely compel all mem-
ber teams to comply with the laws of the strictest state.”217 
Miller and Partee would prove advantageous to the NCAA should 
it challenge the Fair Pay to Play Act in court.  The rulings affirm a core 
NCAA postulation that it cannot effectively function as a national entity 
in the absence of the ability to enforce national rules.218  To that point, 
the NCAA could credibly highlight the inconsistent obligations of legis-
lative proposals governing NIL in other states.  Some of those proposals 
feature important variances from the Fair Pay to Play Act.  These vari-
ances, the NCAA would contend, hinder the organization’s ability to 
identify a harmonized, national approach to NIL.  New York’s proposed 
legislation, for example, features a requirement that an injured athlete 
account be adopted and funded through NIL revenues and that schools 
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must share licensing revenue with its athletes.219  These constraints en-
vision the NIL relationship as between the athlete, his or her school and 
third party licensees—in other words, the “school” enters the NIL rela-
tionship in a way that the Fair Pay to Play Act does not contemplate.  
The NCAA could persuasively maintain that a patchwork approach of 
conflicting states’ NIL statutes would make it impossible for the NCAA 
to comply with the laws of each and every state.220 
On the other hand, Miller and Partee could be distinguished from 
California creating a statutory right for college athletes to be able to ne-
gotiate with third parties through the Fair Pay to Play Act.  Miller in-
volved procedural and fairness assurances related to NCAA allegations 
of misconduct.221  Partee, meanwhile, centered on the economic rela-
tionship between NFL players and their employing NFL teams.222  The 
Fair Pay to Play Act, in contrast, concerns the rights of college athletes 
outside of their responsibilities to their school, conference, and the 
NCAA.223  Stated differently, the “commerce” implicated through the 
Fair Pay to Play Act is contained within the relationship between college 
athletes and entities that fall outside of the boundaries of amateurism.224 
In addition, the NCAA has, to some degree, conceded some ground 
on the claim that uniform rules are necessary for amateurism to properly 
function.  Most notably, the NCAA has relaxed the relationship between 
amateurism and college athletes who earn Olympic medals, prize 
money, and stipends.225  Those athletes are permitted to accept prize pay-
ments from the U.S.  Olympic Committee for medal wins at the Olym-
pics, World Championships, and other competitions without jeopardiz-
ing their amateurism status.226  Likewise, they can accept various 
“commemorative items” including mobile phones, earbuds, footwear, 
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and apparel, and are allowed to receive training stipends and various 
payments for travel, room and board, and health expenses.227 
Olympic athletes are not the only beneficiaries of NCAA deviations 
from a mostly absolutist view of amateurism.  For instance, prior to full-
time enrollment in college, tennis players can retain up to $10,000 in 
annual prize money while maintaining amateur status.228  After enrol-
ling, college tennis players can accept prize money at tournaments pro-
vided the prize does not exceed necessary expenses for tournament par-
ticipation.229  Meanwhile, colleges in Power Five conferences can admit 
and enroll high school baseball players who are drafted by Major League 
Baseball teams and who hire agents.230  With the NCAA’s blessing, these 
conferences have agreed to expand the scope of allowable representation 
without triggering amateurism violations.231  If the player declines to 
sign and instead goes to college, he must terminate his contract with the 
agent.232  Other types of college athletes would forfeit their eligibility by 
hiring an agent.  These concessions are narrow.  They also do not vary 
by state, which would be a manifestation of divergent NIL statutes.  Still, 
they undermine the NCAA’s capacity to persuasively assert that uniform 
policies for college athletes are an essential ingredient for amateurism. 
With uncertainty over the compatibility of states’ NIL statutes and 
the Commerce Clause, national legislation for NIL might prove to be a 
super vehicle.  To that end, U.S. Rep. Mark Walker has introduced 
House Resolution 1804, also known as the “Student-Athlete Equity Act” 
(Equity Act).233  The Equity Act proposes that the Internal Revenue Code 
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of 1986 be amended to condition the NCAA’s status as a non-profit to 
the NCAA permitting college athletes to gain compensation for their 
names, images, and likenesses.234  If the Equity Act became law, it would 
avoid potential Commerce Clause challenges since it would establish 
uniform NIL rules for college sports in the U.S.235 
IV. THE HAZY LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR NCAA AGENT 
CERTIFICATION 
This Article has analyzed an evolving space for the commercializa-
tion of college athletes’ labor and identities.  While the NCAA opposes 
athletes receiving monies that exceed categories of allowable reimburse-
ments, there is increasing external pressure on the NCAA to revisit its 
resistance.236  Today’s system of amateurism will likely transform as the 
2020s play out. 
The roles played by agents in this changing world are likewise mu-
table.  NCAA rules currently permit the work of “advisors” to counsel 
college athletes.  These advisors are often agents.237  Advisors cannot be 
compensated for future services and cannot represent an athlete in nego-
tiations for a contract.238  An advisor can, however, discuss the merits of 
a possible contract and guide the athlete’s parents as well as the athlete 
himself or herself through the decision-making process on whether to 
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turn pro.239  Advisors’ capacity to offer advice suggests that they func-
tion in many ways as agents.240 
Advisors are commonly used in baseball and hockey.241  In both 
sports, the NCAA permits players to be drafted professionally and then 
matriculate, or return, to school.242  A player drafted by a National 
Hockey League (“NHL”) team out of high school, for instance, can de-
cline to sign with the NHL team and instead attend college.  While in 
college, he and the NHL team can negotiate a contract.243  In this situa-
tion, the NHL team benefits a great deal.  The player develops his game 
playing college hockey without the NHL team incurring cost for that de-
velopment.244  The “advisor,” though technically barred from negotiat-
ing, tends to play an instrumental role in discussions as to when the 
player ought to leave college for a pro contract.245  The NCAA does not 
require advisors to meet any certification or equivalent measures. 
In recent years, the NCAA has expanded the scope of allowable 
representation—for certain college athletes, that is.  As noted above, in 
2014, the NCAA permitted the five largest conferences (i.e., the Atlantic 
Coast Conference (“ACC”), Big 12, Big Ten, Pac-12, and Southeastern 
Conference (“SEC”)) to modify their rules on representation for baseball 
players.246  These conferences have all agreed to permit high school play-
ers drafted by Major League Baseball teams to hire an agent.247  If the 
player declines to sign and instead goes to college, he must terminate his 
contract with the agent.248 
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The fact that college students who play hockey, tennis, baseball, 
and Olympic sports are the main beneficiaries of nuances to amateurism 
is not without sociological implications.  These players are mostly or 
significantly white, whereas men’s basketball and football players—who 
are denied access to representation and who generate the vast majority 
of revenue in college sports—are predominantly Black.249  The follow-
ing table describes NCAA data published in 2020 and displays racial 
compositions of Division I student athletes from selected sports.250 
 






Baseball 4.4% 78.2% 17.4% 
Men’s Basketball 51% 26% 23% 
Women’s Basketball 48.4% 24.2% 27.4% 
Football 46% 37% 17% 
Men’s Gymnastics 3.4% 65.2% 31.4% 
Women’s Gymnastics 11% 62% 27% 
Men’s Ice Hockey 1% 76% 23% 
Women’s Ice Hockey >1% 68% 32% 
Men’s Swimmming 2% 68% 30% 
Women’s Swimming 1% 76% 23% 
Men’s Tennis 2% 45% 53% 
Women’s Tennis 5% 42% 53% 
 
Sports figures have taken note of this dynamic.  O’Bannon, for in-
stance, opines that “it’s hard to ignore race” when studying amateurism 
rules.251  “A system in which basketball and football players are treated 
differently from hockey and baseball players,” O’Bannon writes, “raises 
questions about why certain groups are treated differently.  You could 
argue that it seems discriminatory, if not in intent then in effect.”252 
Within this backdrop, the NCAA now intends to certify agents to 
represent men’s basketball players as they potentially transition into the 
NBA.253  It is unclear that the NCAA possesses a legal right to certify 
agents or from where such a right would emanate.  Unlike the NBPA, 
 
 249. O’BANNON & MCCANN, supra note 42, at 88; Thompson, supra note 134. 
 250. Diversity Research, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/diver-
sity-research (last visited Oct. 18, 2020). 
 251. O’BANNON & MCCANN, supra note 42, at 231-32. 
 252. Id. 
 253. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, § 12.3.1.2. 
 
2020] JUMP BALL: THE UNSETTLED LAW 211 
the NCAA is not a labor organization.  The NCAA is, as mentioned ear-
lier, a not-for-profit entity that represents colleges and conferences in 
collegiate athletics.254  It therefore is not recognized by the NLRB as the 
exclusive bargaining agent of employees that, in turn, licenses and reg-
ulates agents to represent those employees.255  The NCAA is also not 
affiliated with a labor organization, such as the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”).256  There 
is no associated entity that would bestow the NCAA with authorities un-
der labor law.257  The NCAA therefore can’t “license” agents to represent 
college athletes, at least as that term is understood under the NLRA.258  
Further, the NCAA is unlike an insurance company, which employs 
“agents” who function as salespersons because there would be no agency 
relationship between players agents’ and the NCAA.259 
Likewise, the NCAA is not an arm of the government statutorily 
empowered to license agents.  Whereas a state board of registration func-
tions as a licensor of real estate brokers, there is no equivalent entity for 
NCAA agents.260  In that same vein, the NCAA, as a private entity, is 
not empowered as a state agency to require agents to register.261  It also 
 
 254. See supra Section I. 
 255. See supra Section II.B. 
 256. See Kenneth Quinnell, 8 Reasons College Athletes Need a Union, AFL-CIO (Jan. 30, 
2014), https://aflcio.org/2014/1/30/8-reasons-college-athletes-need-union. 
 257. See Michael Z. Green & Kyle T. Carney, Can NFL Players Obtain Judicial Review 
of Arbitration Decisions on the Merits when a Typical Hourly Union Worker Cannot Obtain 
This Unusual Court Access?, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 442 (2017) (noting that 
the NFLPA is affiliated with the AFL-CIO). 
 258. See generally David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective 
Bargaining By Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 (1990) (discussing the history of 
collective bargaining agreements among professional employees in the U.S.). 
 259. Daniel Gregory Sakall, Can the Public Really Count on Insurance Agents to Advise 
Them? A Critique of the “Special Circumstances” Test, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 991, 993-95 (2000) 
(discussing majority view of insurance agents as salespersons). See generally DARREN A. 
HEITNER, HOW TO PLAY THE GAME: WHAT EVERY SPORTS ATTORNEY NEEDS TO KNOW (2d 
ed. 2018) (detailing the necessary steps for agents to comply with state and other laws). 
 260. See Quintin Johnstone, An Overview of the Legal Profession in the United States, 
How That Profession Recently has Been Changing, and Its Future Prospects, 26 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 737, 749-50, 749 n.41, 750 n.42 (2008) (noting the role of state governments in li-
censing professionals, including real estate brokers). 
 261. In New York, for example, agents who intend to practice in the state must apply to 
the New York Department of Licensing Services. See N.Y. DEP’T. OF ST., ATHLETE AGENT 
APPLICATION, https://www.dos.ny.gov/forms/licensing/1640-a.pdf (last visited, Mar. 1, 
2020); see also Zach Schreiber, Leveling the Playing Field for Sports Agents: How the Two-
Hat Theory and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Collide, 19 TEX. REV. ENT. & 
SPORTS L. 13, 15-16 (2018) (discussing state agencies that regulate sports agents). 
 
212 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
does not function as a law enforcement agency that upholds state regis-
tration requirements.262 
For their part, college athletes are unlike professional athletes em-
ployed by teams and members of unions.  College athletes are not em-
ployees of their colleges, conferences, or the NCAA.263  Indeed, NCAA 
rules forbid them from invoking the rights of workers to freely associate 
and organize as a labor organization, unlike professional athletes.264  Un-
der the NLRA, a union can negotiate on behalf of employees and repre-
sent the interests of prospective employees, too.265  However, a union 
cannot bargain on behalf of students—athletes or otherwise—since the 
students are not employees of their schools, conferences, or the NCAA266  
Unless courts, state agencies, or legislatures recognize them as employ-
ees under an applicable statutory definition, college athletes are simply 
enrolled students who play a sport in addition to pursuing a degree.267 
This characterization of the relationship between student-athletes 
and universities signifies two relevant points for purposes of the NCAA 
attempting to “certify” agents to represent college students.  First, the 
NCAA adopting the role of an agent licensor would be a unique creation.  
It would not fit traditional conceptions of an agent.  No other private 
entity wields an equivalent power over the agents of others within a con-
tractual relationship and without any government authority to do so.  The 
NCAA would position itself simultaneously in a legislative and admin-
istrative role due to its purported duty to certify agents in order to protect 
vulnerable students.  Second, the NCAA’s capacity to exclude agents 
 
 262. See ROBERT H. RUXIN, AN ATHLETE’S GUIDE TO AGENTS 114-16 (2011) (highlight-
ing the role of law enforcement agencies in enforcing state laws, including adoptions of the 
Uniform Athlete Agents Act). 
 263. See supra Section II.B. 
 264. See Patrick Kessock, Out of Service: Does Service Time Manipulation Violate Major 
League Baseball’s Collective Bargaining Agreement?, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1371-72 (2016) 
(detailing the underlying purpose of unions within the context of sports). 
 265. Leigh Steinberg & William David Cornwell Sr., Level Playing Field, 22 L.A. LAW. 
30, 57 (1999). 
 266. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2.9 (describing student-athletes not as employ-
ees but as being “motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social 
benefits to be derived”); see also Billy Witz, N.C.A.A. Is Sued for Not Paying Athletes as 
Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/sports/ncaa-
lawsuit.html (explaining the dispute over whether student-athletes should be considered em-
ployees). 
 267. The possibility of college athletes gaining recognition as employees remains a focal 
point of sports law scholarship. See, e.g., Richard T. Karcher, Big-Time College Athletes’ 
Status as Employees, 33 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 31, 33 (2018) (presenting an argument in 
favor of employee status for certain types of college athletes); see generally Richard Schmal-
beck & Lawrence Zelenak, The NCAA and the IRS: Life at the Intersection of College Sports 
and the Federal Income Tax, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2019) (discussing the federal income 
tax implications of classifying college athlete as employees). 
 
2020] JUMP BALL: THE UNSETTLED LAW 213 
who refuse to follow NCAA procedures is uncertain.  The NCAA could 
enact exclusionary rules for agents without government or regulatory 
oversight as to how those rules impact the livelihoods of both agents and 
athletes. 
The “unique creation” of the NCAA as an entity that grants permis-
sion to agents to represent college basketball players would necessitate 
a contractual relationship between the NCAA and agents.  The contract 
would presumably involve the would-be agent applying to the NCAA, 
meeting criteria mentioned earlier in this Article and receiving a condi-
tional license from the NCAA.268  The contract and its related features 
would also need to comply with state laws that require registration of 
sports agents and impose requirements on their interactions with college 
athletes.269 
Furthermore, the NCAA may lack the requisite expertise to evalu-
ate sports agents and oversee them.  Professional players’ associations 
are in the business of representing the interests of players, some of whom 
lack business savvy and financial literacy.270  Players have been victim-
ized by fraudsters, including unscrupulous agents.271  Mindful of their 
memberships’ vulnerabilities, players’ associations provide workshops 
and forums to educate their memberships on basic account and money 
management.272  The associations also tightly regulate agents for 
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financial propriety and hold them accountable.273  It’s unclear if NCAA 
has the wherewithal, expertise or desire to take on these types of safe-
guarding activities.274 
The impact of NCAA agent certification on the supply and availa-
bility of agents also raises concerns.  NCAA certification rules would 
exclude categories of agents from representing college basketball play-
ers.  This exclusion could undermine competition and lower the potential 
output of agent representation.275  Fewer agents would be able to ply 
their craft and thus fewer would compete for securing the representation 
of player clients. 
Meanwhile, players would have a smaller group of agents from 
which to hire.  Some might be denied a chance to retain an agent.  Others 
would be denied the fruits of agents competing for their services.  Still 
others might hire an agent, but their agents may not have sufficient time 
to spend with their clients.276  This forecasts a less competitive market-
place for agents, which would have the peculiar consequence of hurting 
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the very people—the players—whom the NCAA insists it is trying to 
protect. 
This dynamic also raises a potential complication for the NCAA in 
its compliance with Section 1 of the Sherman Act.277  As discussed 
above, Section 1 prohibits competing businesses—including colleges 
and athletic conferences—from conspiring to unreasonably restrain 
trade.278  College athletes have employed Section 1 to challenge, albeit 
unsuccessfully, the legality of the longstanding NCAA prohibition on 
agents. 
Most notably, in Banks v. NCAA, a Notre Dame football player 
signed with an agent in preparation for participating in the 1990 NFL 
Draft.279  By signing, Braxston Banks forfeited his remaining NCAA el-
igibility to play college football.280  Banks went undrafted and then re-
turned to Notre Dame to complete his degree.281  He also hoped to re-
sume his college football career but was ineligible to play.282  Banks then 
challenged the NCAA no-agent rule as a violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.283  He asserted that the NCAA and its members effected a 
boycott of his football talents.284  This boycott, Banks maintained, 
harmed his ability to develop his football skills, prevented him from mar-
keting his identity, and denied him the opportunity to gain the wisdom 
of a skilled agent.285 
Writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge 
John Louis Coffey rejected Banks’s arguments, finding that Banks had 
failed to adequately explain how the restraint of “no agents” diminished 
competition for his services in the marketplace for college football.286  
Coffey also highlighted “procompetitive” arguments raised by the 
NCAA for amateurism rules.287  By excluding agents and imposing other 
measures that ostensibly insulate college sports from professional influ-
ences, amateurism rules might enhance the integrity of college 
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football.288  Such rules are also thought to enhance greater consumer in-
terest since some fans perceive college sports as less corrupted than pro-
fessional sports.289 
Banks suggests that the NCAA can lawfully prohibit sports agents 
under federal antitrust law.290  However, Banks doesn’t address the 
NCAA’s role as a licensing and regulating entity of a group of profes-
sionals.291  This role is appreciably different from its role as an entity that 
categorically bars that group.  In the former, the NCAA unlawfully in-
fluences a market—the market for agent services—that antitrust law ob-
ligates to remain competitive.292  Stated differently, precedent favorable 
to the NCAA for the purpose of banning all agents does not insulate the 
NCAA from antitrust scrutiny for banning only some agents. 
In addition, Banks wouldn’t assist a court in understanding why the 
NCAA deemed NBPA certification rules sufficient for underclassmen 
who pursued the 2019 NBA Draft but insufficient for underclassmen 
who pursue the 2020 NBA Draft and other drafts.293  A set of rules re-
garded as protecting underclassmen in one year would, absent a convinc-
ing explanation to the contrary, presumably hold true for subsequent 
years. 
If the NCAA’s certification of agents were challenged in an anti-
trust suit by an excluded agent, the NCAA would assert that agent re-
strictions constitute reasonable measures to protect student athletes.  The 
NCAA would stress that agents to college athletes must be capable of 
providing advice that blends professional aspirations with educational 
goals.  Agents to college underclassmen who are in the midst of making 
a decision regarding whether to turn pro are advising individuals with 
unique and temporal considerations.  These agents should, to some de-
gree, have relevant expertise and be able to objectively explain the edu-
cational ramifications of leaving school.  Of course, college is not a 
“one-shot” deal.  Students who leave college for the workplace before 
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graduating can later complete degrees by taking online courses, adopting 
a part-time student status, or reenrolling as full-time students.294  Still, 
an agent who is mindful of near-term educational considerations would 
possess the knowledge to address one piece of the player’s decision.  In 
contrast, agents to NBA players and other professional athletes are al-
most entirely focused on professional objectives, be they negotiations of 
contracts, cultivation of marketing opportunities, or planning for retire-
ment.295 
The persuasiveness of the NCAA’s arguments would hinge on its 
ability to empirically prove that certification steps are predictive of an 
agent’s capacity to effectively advise the player.296  Likewise, the NCAA 
would be tasked with establishing that less restrictive measures would 
fail to achieve the same results.297  The NCAA would also need to ex-
plain its methodology for addressing agents who fail to seek or obtain 
certification.  In assessing the restrictiveness of the certification process, 
courts would examine whether any remedial measures exist, such as al-
ternative methods to obtain certification.298 
V. CONCLUSION 
The NCAA is capable of defending certification provisions for 
would-be agents to men’s college basketball players from antitrust scru-
tiny.  The cogency of such a defense would turn on whether certification 
rules are carefully designed to meet the unique educational and 
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professional needs of college students who are contemplating leaving 
school early for the NBA draft and exploring the commercial value of 
their NIL with prospective sponsors.  A more disruptive concern is 
whether the NCAA ought to impose restrictions that extend beyond 
those required by the NBPA.  The market for agents to basketball players 
is already structured in ways that have effectively excluded many 
younger agents and women agents.  The fundamental goal of agent cer-
tification should be to enhance the welfare of the client.  The NCAA 
would be wise to embrace that goal in the policies it pursues. 
